

## **Inclusion or Illusion? Mapping Moroccan Attitudes toward Amazigh Visibility in Public Space, Politics, and Civil Society**

Brahim Ait Laaguid<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Faculty of Law and Political Science, Hassan I University, Morocco

\*Corresponding Author's Email: [brahim.laaguid@uhp.ac.ma](mailto:brahim.laaguid@uhp.ac.ma)

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### **Abstract**

**Aims:** This study surveys Moroccans' attitudes and standpoints on the Amazigh language's integration into public administration, public space, political work, and the activities of Amazigh civil society associations. **Methods:** A thematic analysis framework is drawn upon to examine data gathered through a structured survey with 150 respondents from various Moroccan regions. For contextual sustenance, the thematic exploration is bolstered by basic quantifications. **Result:** The findings reveal substantial public support for the use of Amazigh in public services to help monolingual Amazigh speakers communicate and streamline legal procedures. Cultural diversity and citizenship values are also viewed as being promoted thanks to the visibility of Tifinagh in public space. Highlighting its value in promoting diversity in the political sphere, participants predominantly support adopting the Amazigh language for political engagement. With reference to the work of Amazigh civil society organizations, views are divergent. Some respondents acknowledge these organizations' momentous contributions, yielded despite demanding conditions, while others critique them for inefficiency and ideological biases. **Implication:** These insights call attention to more policy and community action and emphasize the emerging role of Amazigh in Moroccan society.

**Keywords:** Amazigh, attitudes, Morocco, public space, administration, politics, civil society, thematic analysis

### **Introduction**

The co-officialization of Amazigh in Morocco entails its presence in people's daily life. The language's absence, otherwise, would reveal the real status of the language. Public administrations are among the institutions awaited to promote the Amazigh language use. However, their human resources are not trained in the Amazigh language. They are not equipped with the competencies required to communicate with monolingual Amazigh speakers.

There has been administrative discrimination against Amazighs who find it difficult to register the birth of newborn babies under Amazigh names (U.S. Department of State, 2021). There is also an important remark as to the use of Tifinagh on some institutions' banners and traffic signs. It has lately been observed and recorded that the Tifinagh written form of some public institutions' names is not quite accurate. The reason, more likely, is that they are not made by experts.

Moreover, the documents promulgated by administrations, including national identity cards, passports, driving licenses, and residency cards, do not include an Amazigh version; instead,

there is a French version, which shows that the French model of administration is still in action (Reino, 2007).

The Amazigh language is not used during the plenary sessions of the parliament and its institutions. Instant interpretation is not also provided in courts, particularly in cases where monolingual Amazighs are concerned (The National Federation of Amazigh Associations [FNAA], 2017). As a clarification to the motives behind this disregard, Boukous (2012, p. 58) states that “the domains providing prestige and weight such as the parliament, justice, administration, television, university, etc. are more or less domains restricted to Standard Arabic—the official language”.

Amazigh is also relatively used in social public spaces, including family communicative patterns, workplace, streets, and school. Due to the dominance of Moroccan Darija as a *lingua franca* and the continuation of urbanization, Amazigh’s visibility has nonetheless been decreasing (Boukous, 2012).

This paper reports Moroccans’ attitudes and views on the incorporation of the Amazigh language into highly influential domains of public life. It particularly attempts to spark a scholarly discussion about themes that have fairly been explored, especially Amazigh in the political life and civil society engagement.

To attain the intended research goals, the study was guided by the ensuing questions:

1. What are the public attitudes toward using the Amazigh language in public administration, and what factors influence these attitudes?
2. How do Moroccans perceive the presence of Tifinagh script in public space, and what cultural or societal values does it promote?
3. To what extent is the Amazigh language considered integral to political work and activism in Morocco?
4. What are the public's evaluations of Amazigh civil society associations, and what challenges or successes do these organizations encounter?

To outline the historical and political context of Amazigh identity, it is vital to recognize that the Amazigh people, indigenous to North Africa, have a rich history that predates Arabization and Islamization in the region. Centuries of sociocultural interactions have shaped the Moroccan Amazigh identity, comprising the French colonization, which had greatly influenced their sociopolitical standing. The French colonial intrusion epitomized a critical juncture in the history of Morocco; it drastically upended the existing power forces and established novel dynamics affecting the Amazigh identity. This was attained through the adoption of the colonial policies of “divide and rule”, rural codes, and the promotion of the “Berber Dahir” (decree) in 1930 (Gellner & Micaud, 1973). The Amazigh groups were relegated during the colonial period. Nevertheless, Amazighphones were often privileged over Arabophone groups by the French. This situation resulted in a complex relationship between the central state and the Amazigh (Maddy-Weitzman, 2001).

The Arabization policy shaped the post-independence era in Morocco. It massively undermined the eminence of the Amazigh language and culture. A systematic exclusion and marginalization from the national narrative transpired. Meanwhile, Arabic and Islam were the two unassailable cornerstones of Moroccan identity (Guabli, 2024). This segregation strategy was not only cultural but also political, as Amazigh militants were frequently denied access to decision-

making processes.

For decades, Amazigh people fought for the constitutional and official recognition of the Amazigh language. Constant advocacy and pressure from Amazigh organizations led to the long-awaited achievement in 2011. Yet, this acknowledgement, albeit official on paper, has been approached inconsistently and leisurely. Morocco's language policy has been shaped by a tense polarization, with the Amazigh persistently demanding the application of the laws related to the official character of the Amazigh language and the state's relentless adherence to the Arab-Islamic identity (Moustaoui, 2006).

Several challenges impede the full-fledged incorporation of the Amazigh language into public life. In 2001, King Mohammed VI issued a decree to establish the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) to safeguard and promote the Amazigh language and culture (Quinn, 2020). In 2003, Amazigh was introduced into primary education. However, the process of development has stopped at this level; the consecutive governments have failed to vertically and horizontally generalize the teaching of the language. The Amazigh language, thus far, does not enjoy the same prestigious status as Arabic and French in Moroccan primary classrooms. According to Zakhir (2023), the extensive use of Amazigh in schools has been limited due to insufficient funding and resistance from those who favor Standard Arabic. Indicating the importance of positive social attitudes toward Amazigh, Ait Laaguid (2024) suggests:

To genuinely promote the Amazigh language and identity through its integration into the sphere of education, it is essential for decision-makers, teachers, professors, educators, and textbook developers to work on shifting Moroccans' attitudes toward Amazigh in a more positive direction. (p. 54)

Furthermore, there have been different forms of stigmatization and marginalization associated with the Amazigh language. Alalou (2023) states that the government has traditionally pushed Amazigh to the periphery, while favoring Arabic and French in its language policy. Amazigh is, therefore, often regarded as lacking practical relevance, leading to a situation of attrition in urban areas (Quinn, 2020).

The Amazigh movement has been a major lobbying force in the advocacy for Amazigh people's socioeconomic, linguistic, and cultural rights. The movement activists played a central role in sensitizing, resisting, and reframing the Amazigh collective identity. It has advanced over the years, becoming a global dynamic network. It has, more particularly, gained momentum as part of the global indigeneity movement (Guabli, 2024). The movement has diversified its techniques of activism, including media campaigns, political lobbying, and protests.

The so-called Arab Spring significantly contributed to Amazigh activism, as new opportunities unfolded. It furthered political mobilization among Amazigh militants, who aimed to make use of the political fluctuations caused by the protests (Maddy-Weitzman, 2022). Nonetheless, the movement has also encountered several challenges, comprising the Amazigh demands' co-optation by the state and the fierce ideological resistance by Arabization advocates who regard Amazigh activism as a threat to national unity (Maddy-Weitzman, 2001).

Public attitudes toward the Amazigh language and culture in Morocco are complex. Research has revealed an ambivalence in addressing the socio-political status of Amazigh (El Borji, 2022; Ichou & Fathi, 2022; Zakhir, 2023); while there is an increasing acknowledgement of

Amazigh's significance in Moroccan society, there are still serious challenges related to the language's acceptance and visibility in public and political life.

Moroccans' perceptions of the Amazigh language are affected by several factors, including education, region, and ethnicity. Studies have demonstrated that, while there are generally positive attitudes toward the language, a significant disparity exists based on self-reported ethnicity (Idhssaine & El Kirat, 2019). Among the most common arguments used by Moroccan pan-Arabists to hinder the generalization of Amazigh is the belief that it lacks instrumental value, raising, hence, practical concerns (Idhssaine, 2020).

Public perceptions of the Amazigh language and culture have also been shaped by the media. In Moroccan government-owned outlets, Amazigh has faced cultural marginalization, underrepresentation, and misrepresentation (El Kadoussi et al., 2024). These outlets have historically been dominated by Arabic and French, allowing minimal scope for Amazigh. However, new opportunities and venues have been opened by digital media for Amazigh activists to promote their language and advocate for Amazigh linguistic and cultural rights (Ait Laaguid & Khaloufi, 2023; Lafkioui, 2013; Lafkioui, 2008). Digital platforms have been instrumentally approached to revitalize the Amazigh language and culture, as well as to defy the prevailing narratives in mainstream media (El Kadoussi et al., 2024).

The framing of Amazigh visibility in Morocco captures the intricate interplay of language, politics, and civic engagement, highlighting a vibrant and evolving process. Even though there have been notable successes, more activism and support are needed to overcome the encountered obstacles and guarantee that the Amazigh language and culture are completely accepted and assimilated into Moroccan society.

This study, more specifically, sought:

1. To investigate public attitudes toward the use of the Amazigh language in public administration and its implications for service accessibility.
2. To evaluate the societal reception of Tifinagh script in public space and its impact on cultural representation.
3. To assess the role and perceived importance of Amazigh in political activities and governance. AND;
4. To analyze public evaluations of Amazigh civil society associations in terms of their contributions, challenges, and perceived biases.

## **Method**

### *Research Design and Approach*

This study adopts a qualitative design, resorting to quantifications (frequencies and percentages) in particular cases to render the findings more robust, valid, and reliable. Thematic analysis coding scheme is employed to delve into the nuanced attitudes and perspectives of participants. It relies on exploratory procedures to reveal recurrent themes and patterns associated with the use of Amazigh in public and political domains.

### *Data Collection*

A sample of 150 respondents from sundry geographic and demographic backgrounds in Morocco were targeted for data collection. A structured questionnaire, including both open ended and close ended items, was utilized to encompass a wide range of perspectives. Purposive sampling

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was specifically used to ensure equal representation of participants from remote, rural, and urban areas, in order to epitomize Morocco's linguistic and cultural plurality.

### *Data Analysis*

To systematically identify and interpret key themes from the qualitative data, thematic analysis was implemented. Responses were categorized under thematic headings, using coding techniques. However, to support the thematic findings, frequencies and percentages were calculated, forming a significant part of the overall investigation.

## **Results and Discussion**

### **A. Results**

#### ***Amazigh in Public Administration***

The first primary domain of public life that was investigated was the presence of Amazigh in administration. The sample was asked about their opinions on the use of Amazigh in public administration for oral communication and writing administrative documents. Two different areas of use were explored: oral and written communication.

It is believed that Amazigh speakers, given that their language is official in the constitution, have the right to be reached in Amazigh inside Moroccan public administrations. The sample was split into proponents and opponents of the issue in general, and the writing of administrative documents in Amazigh in particular.

**Table 1:** Opinions on the use of Amazigh in Moroccan public administrations

Category	Themes	Frequency
Agreed	1 For monolingual Amazigh speaking areas	112
	2 Simplifying the legal proceedings for non-Arabs	
Disagreed	1 Teaching first then use in administrative documents	28
	2 Not a language of law and administration	
	3 Not useful to all groups	
Neutral		10

The number of participants supporting the use of Amazigh in the Moroccan public administration exceeded that of the opponents. The first predominant category displayed consent for essentially two reasons. There are monolingual Amazigh speakers in remote Amazigh areas who struggle to communicate with staff working in public administrations, including courts, hospitals, and other public services.

The use of Amazigh is therefore supposed to simplify the administrative and legal proceedings for all Moroccans without exception in an attempt to bring the administration closer to citizens.: *“the state then has to afford all the necessary means to respond to the needs of citizens since what connects the citizen to the state is the administration”* (extract 12, item 13). This is held to be *“necessary to assert Amazigh's officialization and constitutionalization”* (extract 106, item 13).

The participants who opposed the debated belief gave comparably three reasons. They wondered how a language can be used in administrative documents when in all the truth it is not



learned by Moroccans. This entails that unless Amazigh is taught to all Moroccans, it cannot be used in administrative dealings. On the other hand, the use of Amazigh in public administrations is still a far-reaching practice because “*it is not a language of law and management*” (extract 120, item 13); hence, “*the ground should be laid for this great project*” (extract 65, item 13).

These respondents thought that Morocco is not yet ready to venture into such an enormous enterprise as the Amazigh language still needs to be improved and adapted to the various domains of language use. The preparations are to include not only the provision of highly qualified human resources but also, and most importantly, a simplified form of Amazigh that can be equally assimilated by citizens and employees.

The fact that “*not all people can understand Amazigh*” (extract 99, item 13), meaning that there are other communities who do not speak nor read Amazigh, make some participants believe that using the language would be “*extremely discriminative*” (extract 122, item 13) and eventually “*not useful to all groups*” (extract 88, item 13). The respondents holding this perspective find the idea of Amazigh being used in administrations implausible, without considering the presence of French to be problematic.

This is completely the opposite of the standpoint shared by the participants from the first category. The latter claimed that Amazighs should be given the same advantage enjoyed by the (Moroccan) Arabic speakers, while the former regarded the use of Amazigh as inconvenient to other non-Amazigh-speaking communities. The third category, however, had no opinion, leaving the space provided for the answer blank, or straightforwardly stating that they did not care.

### ***Amazigh in Public Space***

Another area of prominence associated with the implementation of Amazigh’s official character is Tifinagh’s presence in public space, including institutions’ panels, road signboards, billboards, and the front facades of shops. The participants were enquired about their opinions on the related presence. Two broad opinions could be identified, each of which was endorsed by the two categories in several respects, as elucidated in Table 2.

**Table 2:** Views on the presence of Amazigh in public space

Category	Themes	Frequency
Good	1 The ability to promote the culture of difference and good citizenship	92
	2 Being familiar with Amazigh	
Not good	1 Only for decoration	40
Neutral		18


The use of Amazigh in public space was held by the majority of respondents to be satisfying. Most frequently, they emphasized that it has contributed to the promotion of the Amazigh component, respecting Morocco’s linguistic differences and making everyone familiar with Tifinagh. Most answers focused on Souss-Massa as the region where most public spaces have witnessed an expansion at the level of the Amazigh language use. Some respondents further stressed the need for publicizing Amazigh places’ names in Tifinagh “*as a way of retaining the original identity of such spaces*” (extract 46, item 14).

The other group of participants who found the presence of Amazigh in public space as “*limited*” (extract 50, item 15), “*weak*” (extract 3, item 15), or even “*insignificant*” (extract 97,

item 15), criticized the actual purpose of the language's use. The same argument expressed before concerning the use of Amazigh in administrations was also used in this context, asking why Amazigh should be present in public space when most Moroccans cannot understand Tifinagh. An important part of the sample did not give any opinion, confirming that they could not take sides, or they had no interest in the matter in the first place.

### ***Amazigh in Politics***


The use of Amazigh in political work or the use of different political mechanisms to promote and defend the rights of the Amazigh community has been the locus of an ongoing discussion among Amazigh activists and people interested in the Amazigh issue. To investigate the sample's perceptions of both aspects, the participants were asked to express their agreement or disagreement with the statement that Amazigh, as an official language in the constitution alongside Arabic, should be equally used in the political arena, such as the parliament, the statements of political parties, and so on. The results are displayed in Figure 1.



**Figure 1.** Amazigh Language Use in the Political Field

Figure 1 shows that 85.33 percent of the total sample believed that Amazigh should be used in the field of politics, whereas only 5.33 percent thought that it should not. The remaining 9.33 percent refrained from expressing their attitude. Outstandingly, the participants who strongly agreed with the statement formed 57.33 percent, which substantiates that the sample considered that Amazigh's presence in the various areas of political life is indeed a requirement.

The sample's previous responses about the reasons for the deceleration in activating the official character of Amazigh included Amazighs' lack of engagement in political life. The participants' attitude toward the matter was further examined by their reaction to the statement: *"the current Amazigh status can be more developed by Amazigh activists' involvement in politics"*. Approximately, similar proportions to the ones shown in Figure 1 were noticed; 82.66 percent had a positive attitude, 7.33 percent had a negative attitude, and 10 percent were neutral, as shown in Figure 2.



**Figure 2.** Developing Amazigh through the Activists' Engagement in Political Life

Figure 1 and Figure 2, accordingly, demonstrate that Amazigh language use in the different political areas and Amazigh activists' active engagement in the Moroccan political scene are necessary and highly demanded. But the reactions could not show the intended form of such inclusion and involvement.

However, a move of the sort has been in effect recently taken. It was, therefore, an opportunity to try to discover that form, further investigate the revealed attitude toward Amazigh's promotion through politics and engagement in political life, and eventually solidify the validity of the attained results; the respondents were asked about their own opinions on the recent coalition between the Amazigh Political Action Front, formed by a group of Amazigh activists, with some political parties, including the National Rally of Independents and the Popular Movement.

More than a third of the participants (40.66 %) had no idea about this political coalition that took place a few days before the 2021 Moroccan general elections. The other 59.33 percent of the sample had two opposite attitudes: 34.66 percent were pessimistic and suspicious, whereas 24.66 percent established that the coalition would have a positive effect on the future of Amazigh.

The pessimistic respondents argued that the Amazigh issue is beyond the addressed interests; the current coalition, therefore, shows the exploitation of the cause for political purposes. They also mentioned that they drew on the experience of the Moroccan Amazigh Democratic Party, led by Ahmed Adgherni in 2005, which was banned as it represented Amazigh, stating that the dominant logic of such parties is the duality of the leader and followers. The Amazigh component would hence *"be treated as a sheer ground and means and not as a special side with a peculiarity and demands"* (extract 135, item 17).

This manifests these participants' mistrust of the Moroccan political parties and preference for other procedures far from these political organizations' authority. The participants believed that *"all the parties have nothing to give to Amazigh or anything else"* (extract 116, item 17). The representatives of the Amazigh Political Front were also labeled by the participants as *"opportunistic"* (extract 96, item 17) and *"unaware of the steps they are taking"* (extract 138, item 17), jeopardizing the common interest in favor of their own.

On the other hand, the optimistic participants maintained that the step taken by the Front



was quite decisive so that “*the voice of Amazighs would be heard*” (extract 84, item 17). It seems that these respondents’ attitude originates from their conviction that Amazighs need people to represent them in political events in whatever way possible.

### ***Attitudes toward Amazigh Civil Society Associations***

There have been several associations and organizations based in different cities in Morocco created essentially to defend Amazighs’ linguistic and cultural rights. Evaluating such institutions’ pleadings for the Amazigh cause today cannot be done on an individual basis. People’s experiences, observations, and perceptions of these associations’ efforts can indeed illustrate a facet of Moroccans’ social discourse on the topic. The participants were therefore asked about how they could describe the efforts of the Amazigh associations.

The presented descriptions could overall be classified into two types: *positive* and *negative*. The first class demonstrated great satisfaction with what such associations are doing, while the second class averred their failure and flaws. Each class had its reasons. There was strikingly, however, a relatively large third group that had no idea about the whole subject. These are all elucidated in Table 3.

**Table 3:** Participants’ evaluation of Amazigh associations’ work

Category	Themes	Frequency
Positive	1 Great gains	58
	2 Advanced despite the lack of means	
Negative	1 Meaningless without proper attention and action	62
	2 Serving ideological and political agendas	
	3 Serving personal interests	
Neutral		30

There is not much disparity between the two descriptions in terms of frequency. The group that evaluated the associations’ efforts as respectable and substantial referred to the lobbying force these associations have exercised “*to defend Amazighs and their issues, despite all the obstacles standing in their way*” (extract 84, item 18). The development of the mechanisms, relied on to make the pleadings, has also been emphasized, representing the persistent attempts to promote Amazigh.

The participants whose attitude can be defined as unfavorable had mainly three distinct views. They first described the associations’ efforts as “*weak*” (extract 5, item 18), “*a waste of time*” (extract 126, item 18), and covered with “*too many slogans and demands*” (extract 31, item 18) since the decision-makers barely make a move responding to the pleadings. They also pointed out that these associations “*need development and variety*” (extract 104, item 18). The Amazigh associations’ efforts, which seemingly have had a weak impact, have specifically witnessed “*regression, especially after the constitutionalization of the Amazigh language*” (extract 68, item 18).

There was a subset of respondents within the second category affirming that the related associations have nothing to do with the cause because “*they defend ideological issues and do not defend Amazigh as a commonality to all Moroccans*” (extract 71, item 18), as well as they work for “*the political agenda*” (extract 33, item 18) of powerful groups. These associations have also been believed to only “*heighten the marginal conflicts*” (extract 113, item 18) between the different

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groups in society. It has moreover been indicated that “*most of the pioneering associations in this area serve the interests of the people forming their executive offices, using the Amazigh issue to get rich and gain influence*” (extract 125, item 18). Quite a significant portion of the sample preferred neutrality, possibly for not knowing any of the relevant associations, or not being interested in what they do.

## **B. Discussion**

### ***Amazigh in Administration and Public Space***

It has been revealed that the highest proportion of the sample showed support for using Amazigh in public administrations for oral communication and writing administrative documents. They held that the use of the language would assist monolingual Amazigh speaking areas and simplify the legal and administrative proceedings, given that administration as one of the domains providing prestige and weight is comparatively limited to Standard Arabic (Boukous, 2012) and continues to conform to the French model of legal and administrative public services (Reino, 2007). The participants’ validation of the importance of Amazigh’s use is in contrast with reality which, as affirmed by Idhssaine and El Kirat’s (2019), shows that Amazigh is almost never used in administration.

The findings also suggest that the majority of the participants believed that the use of Amazigh in public space (e.g. institutions’ panels, road signboards, billboards, and the front facades of shops) promotes the culture of difference and good citizenship. They felt satisfied with the current presence of Amazigh in such spaces as it contributes to the social acceptance of Tifinagh. This approval shows that Amazigh is sufficiently used in public space, a finding which does not match with Idhssaine and El Kirat’s (2019) results which asserted that Amazigh is greatly absent in such spaces. There may have lately been an increase in the presence of Amazigh in the two domains of public life, which in return could be regarded as a demonstration of an actual progress.

The opponents of the use in question criticized the actual intents and purposes. Similar to their opinions on the use of Amazigh in administration, these respondents also wondered how Amazigh should be used in public space when in fact not all Moroccans can understand Tifinagh. This finding supports Belhiah’s et al (2020, p. 139) conclusion formulated in the form of a question: “what is the point of developing a unique alphabet when very few people can read it?” This again brings us back to the discussion on the utility of Tifinagh and whether or not it has been the right choice (see also Masbah, 2011; Sadiqi, 2011; Silverstein & Crawford, 2004; Soulaïmani, 2015).

### ***Attitudes toward the Presence of Amazigh in Political Life***

The findings indicate that the vast majority of respondents maintained that Amazigh should be used in the field of politics (e.g. the parliament and the statements of political parties). This finding is inconsistent with Idhssaine and El Kirat’s (2019) results which confirmed that Amazigh is rarely used in the parliament.

Previously, the analysis of the participants’ opinions on the reasons behind the delay to activate the official character of Amazigh included Amazighs’ lack of engagement in the political arena. To further assess their attitudes toward the issue, they were asked whether or not the involvement of Amazigh activists in politics can contribute to the development of Amazigh’s

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status. The reached results were almost identical to the ones related to the Amazigh language use in the political domain. In other words, the great majority showed consent to the speculative statement.

The revealed positive attitudes demonstrate that the presence of Amazigh in political life and the political engagement of Amazigh activists are highly demanded. The question that should be raised in this context is what the form of this engagement is. This was even intensively investigated by examining the participants' opinions on the recent coalition between the Amazigh Political Action Front, formed by a group of Amazigh activists, with some political parties, including the National Rally of Independents and the Popular Movement, a short time before the 2021 Moroccan general elections.

The findings show that more than a third of the respondents were ignorant of the related political coalition. Patently, unless one was interested in both politics and the Amazigh issue, a step as such would not have been known; however, the highest part of the sample had a negative attitude toward the established union. They emphasized that such a political move would only serve the political and ideological interests of particular groups. Amazigh was therefore believed to "be treated as a sheer ground and means and not as a special side with a peculiarity and demands" (extract 135, item 17).

### ***Attitudes toward Amazigh Civil Society Associations***

Since the 1980s, and especially with the publication of the Charter of Linguistic and Cultural Rights (the Agadir Charter) in 1991, the Amazigh associations and organizations have played a major role in the revitalization and promotion of the Amazigh language and culture (Aslan, 2014; Fischer, 2011; Masbah, 2011; Schwed, 2017). The Amazigh associative fabric has essentially been a crucial actor in the struggle for recognizing Amazigh as a national and official language, which was eventually accomplished in 2011.

Nonetheless, in an attempt to explore Moroccan Facebook users' attitudes toward these associations and how they view their line of work, the findings suggest that most of the participants described the experience of the Amazigh associations as negative maintaining that: 1. it is meaningless without proper attention and action, 2. the associations only serve ideological and political agenda, and 3. the associative activists only seek their own personal interests. This finding clearly shows the frustration of Moroccans with the work of these civil society foundations defying thus the conclusions of previously indicated research.

Opinions on the associations' efforts varied between "weak" (extract 5, item 18), "too many slogans and demands" (extract 31, item 18), and that they "need development and variety" (extract 104, item 18). This could be at the level of methods of work or the very content such associations work on or produce; they might thus need to use new tools and diversify the techniques of promoting and defending Amazigh, or reconsider the topics and spheres of work. For instance, they may arrange for workshops on the teaching of Tifinagh, hold academic seminars and discussions about creative solutions and alternatives for developing Amazigh, and organize pieces of training on how to plead for Amazighs' linguistic, cultural, socioeconomic, and even political rights. The intent may therefore be the combination of various domains: the sociocultural, intellectual, legal, economic, and political, instead of being confined only to cultural events such as the celebration of the Amazigh New Year.

The respondents stressed that the associations' efforts have witnessed "*regression, especially after the constitutionalization of the Amazigh language*" (extract 68, item 18). Perhaps the motive for claiming so was the objective behind the associations' pleadings; before 2011, there was one major focus on the part of almost all the associations within the so-called Amazigh movement. This was the inclusion of the Amazigh language in the constitution and its integration into public life (Collado, 2013). But once it became officially counted in, there was a division in how to further the struggle for Amazighity. Each association had its vision, which, therefore, probably, led to the weakness that has been observed. Interestingly, the participants with the unfavorable attitude also stated that "most of the pioneering associations in this area serve the interests of the people forming their executive offices, using the Amazigh issue to get rich and gain influence" (extract 125, item 18).

## **Conclusion**

This paper showcases how the importance of the Amazigh language in Moroccan public life is gradually getting recognized. The findings exhibit that the language's contribution to boosting service accessibility, endorsing cultural diversity, and encouraging inclusion in political activities is extensively acknowledged. Tifinagh's weight as a symbol of Morocco's pluralistic identity and representation of its opulent character is shown by the favorable feedback in public space. The miscellaneous assessments of Amazigh civil society associations, however, underscore the necessity for these organizations to approach the perspectives of impotence, ideological bias, and the absence of discernible outcomes. These findings indicate the prominence of persistent efforts to both incorporate Amazigh into public and political spheres and improve the efficacy and openness of civil society initiatives. Building on these findings, policymakers and community leaders are urged to promote Morocco's linguistic and cultural diversity.

## **Originality Statement**

The author declares that this article is their own work and to the best of their knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for publication in any other published materials, except where due acknowledgement is made in the article. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom the author has worked, is explicitly acknowledged in the article.

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